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This	   paper	   examines	   the	   Macroeconomic	   Imbalance	   Procedure	   (MIP)	   that	   was	   introduced	   in	  
December	  2011	  as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	  EU	  economic	   surveillance	   framework.	   In	  doing	   so,	   this	   study’s	  
primary	   purpose	   is	   to	   begin	   assessing	   the	   potential	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   MIP,	   specifically	   its	   ability	   to	  
identify	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  and	  induce	  remedial	  policy	  action.	  Because	  the	  MIP	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  
procedure	  and	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  upon	  which	  to	  judge	  its	  results	  is	  still	  limited,	  this	  paper	  assesses	  its	  
potential	  effectiveness	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  a	  similar	  initiative,	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund’s	  (IMF	  or	  
Fund)	  macroeconomic	  surveillance.	  At	  first	  glance,	  the	  comparison	  reveals	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  MIP	  
is	   potentially	   greater	   than	   that	  of	   the	   IMF	   surveillance	  because	   the	  MIP	  has	   remedied	   some	  well-­‐known	  
limitations	   in	   the	   Fund’s	  monitoring	   activity,	   including	   the	   lack	   of	   clear	   and	   practical	   advice,	   the	   limited	  
knowledge	  of	  domestic	  polities	  and	  the	  reluctance	  to	  activate	  sanctions	  to	  induce	  corrective	  action.	  	  
Upon	   closer	   inspection,	   however,	   the	   comparison	   reveals	   a	   far	  more	  mixed	   picture	   of	   the	  MIP’s	  
effectiveness.	   In	  particular,	   if	  we	  move	  from	  a	  purely	  formal	  analysis	  of	  the	  MIP’s	   institutional	  design	  and	  
operating	  procedures	  to	  an	  assessment	  that	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  political-­‐economic	  factors	  that	  are	  
likely	  to	  affect	  the	  MIP’s	  actual	  implementation,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  MIP	  appears	  more	  limited.	  Indeed,	  
the	   MIP’s	   effectiveness	   may	   be	   compromised	   by	   its	   limited	   used	   of	   reversed	   qualified	   majority	   voting	  
(RQMV),	  which	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  corrective	  stage	  of	  the	  surveillance	  process.	  Furthermore,	  the	  absence	  of	  
mechanisms	  to	  prevent	  arbitrariness	  in	  the	  application	  of	  sanctions	  and	  the	  asymmetry	  that	  characterises	  
the	   MIP	   adjustment	   process	   open	   the	   door	   to	   political	   interference	   and	   public	   backlash	   that	   risk	  
diminishing	  the	  MIP’s	  effectiveness.	  Finally,	  although	  important	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	   incorporate	  
the	  MIP	  into	  the	  broad	  EU	  economic	  surveillance	  framework,	  financial	  and	  economic	  analyses	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  
fully	  integrated,	  and	  the	  MIP’s	  predominant	  focus	  on	  single	  countries’	  macroeconomic	  developments	  may	  
lead	  the	  procedure	  to	  miss	  important	  systemic	  aspects	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  imbalances	  that	  concern	  a	  
group	  of	  countries	  together.	  	  
Interestingly,	   the	  MIP’s	   shortcomings	   relate	   to	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   in	  which	   the	   IMF	   surveillance	  
experience	  could	  have	  provided	  policy	  guidance	  to	  EU	  policy-­‐makers.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  available	  policy	  lessons,	  
however,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   EU	   policy	   makers	   consciously	   turned	   to	   the	   Fund’s	   experience	   for	  
guidance	  during	  the	  design	  of	  the	  MIP.1	  To	  account	  for	  this	  failure	  to	  incorporate	  previous	  lessons	  learned,	  
three	   factors	   are	   tentatively	   suggested	   in	   the	   concluding	   section.	   These	   factors	   include	   the	   presence	   of	  
competing	   domestic	   experiences,	   the	   institutional	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   political	   cleavage	  
between	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  countries.	  	  
Before	  proceeding,	   three	   clarifications	   are	  needed	   regarding	   the	   focus	   and	   concepts	   used	   in	   this	  
analysis.	   First,	   although	   the	  MIP	   is	   part	   of	   the	   broader	   reform	   agenda	   of	   EU	   economic	   governance,	   the	  
paper	  concentrates	  solely	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  surveillance	  framework	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  to	  
detect	   and	   prevent	   macroeconomic	   imbalances.	   Thus,	   the	   other	   important	   items	   in	   the	   EU	   economic	  
governance	   agenda,	   including	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   the	   Stability	   and	   Growth	   Pact	   (SGP)	   and	   the	   fiscal	  
compact,	  will	  be	  left	  outside	  the	  analysis.	  Furthermore,	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  origins	  
of	  the	  imbalances,	  although	  a	  lively	  debate	  exists	  on	  this	  important	  issue.	  
Second,	  the	  paper	  embraces	  a	  definition	  of	  effectiveness	  that	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  definition	  common	  
in	   the	   literature	  on	   international	   regimes	   (c.f.	   Young,	  1999).2	   Specifically,	  effectiveness	   refers	   to	  whether	  
the	   regime	   (or	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   specific	   surveillance	   initiative)	   ‘solves	   the	   problem	   that	   motivated	   its	  
establishment’	  (Underdal,	  2002,	  p.	  11).	  In	  other	  words,	  effectiveness	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  achieve	  specific	  
outcomes	   or	   solve	   specific	   problems.	   In	   the	   cases	   under	   investigation,	   effectiveness	   thus	   refers	   to	   the	  
ability	  to	  identify	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	  (i.e.,	  prevention)	  and	  to	  induce	  corrective	  
action	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  when	  imbalances	  are	  identified	  (i.e.,	  correction).	  	  
Finally,	   as	   this	   paper	   relies	   on	   a	   focused	   comparison	   between	   MIP	   and	   IMF	   macroeconomic	  
surveillance,3	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  clarify	  from	  the	  outset	  why	  such	  a	  comparison	  is	  warranted.	  To	  start	  with,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As one official put it, ‘the lack of a debate on IMF surveillance was conspicuous by its absence’. Interview with a 
European Central Bank official. Frankfurt, 14 March 2013. 
2 For a different conceptualisation of effectiveness, see, for instance, Gutner and Thompson (2010). 
3 The scope of IMF surveillance was originally conceived as surveillance over exchange rate choices. Over time, 
however, it has become increasingly recognised that the external position of a country is affected by a broader set of 
policies, including structural and financial sector policies.  
similarly	   to	   the	   MIP,	   the	   Fund’s	   surveillance	   focuses	   on	   both	   internal	   and	   external	   disequilibria.	   In	  
particular,	   according	   to	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   (Article	   IV,	   Section	   3),	   ‘the	   Fund	   shall	   oversee	   the	  
international	  monetary	  system	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  its	  effective	  operation,	  and	  shall	  oversee	  the	  compliance	  
of	   each	   member	   with	   its	   obligations’.	   The	   latter	   refers	   to	   the	   obligation	   of	   promoting	   economic	   and	  
financial	  policies	  that	  do	  not	  produce	  erratic	  disruptions	  or	  prevent	  balance	  of	  payment	  adjustments	  in	  the	  
global	  economy	  and	  that	  instead	  foster	  orderly	  economic	  growth	  (see,	  also,	  Mussa,	  1997).	  IMF	  surveillance	  
also	   constitutes	   an	   effective	   reference	   point	   against	   which	   to	   assess	   the	   MIP	   because,	   like	   the	   MIP	  
surveillance,	  it	  is	  mandatory	  for	  member	  countries	  and	  its	  institutional	  design	  comprises	  a	  preventative	  and	  
a	  corrective	  arm.	  	  
The	  paper	   is	   organised	  as	   follows.	   In	   Section	  1,	   I	   review	   the	  main	   features	  of	   the	  MIP.	   Section	  2	  
introduces	  the	  main	  findings	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  macroeconomic	  surveillance.	  Section	  3	  then	  
assesses	  the	  MIP	  against	  the	  findings	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  Specifically,	  the	  paper	  assesses	  the	  
extent	   to	   which	   the	   MIP	   has	   remedied	   the	   problems	   that	   are	   widely	   recognised	   to	   have	   impaired	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  IMF	  surveillance.	  Section	  4	  discusses	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  MIP.	  Finally,	  Section	  5	  concludes	  
by	   reflecting	   on	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   findings	   and	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   EU	   to	   learn	   from	   outside	  
experiences.	  
	  
1. The institutional design and operational procedures of the MIP  
	  
The	  MIP	  entered	   into	   force	  on	  13	  December	  2011	  within	  the	   framework	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘six	  pack’	  set	  of	  
legislation.	   Specifically,	   two	   regulations	   lay	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   prevention	   and	   correction	   of	  
imbalances:	  Regulation	   (EU)	  No	  1176/2011,	  which	   sets	  out	   the	  details	  of	   the	  new	  surveillance	  procedure	  
and	  applies	   to	  all	   EU	  Member	  States,	   and	  Regulation	   (EU)	  No	  1174/2011,	  which	   is	  only	  applicable	   to	   the	  
Eurozone	  members	  and	  provides	  for	  enforcement	  mechanisms.	  
The	   purpose	   of	   the	  MIP	   is	   to	   prevent	   and	   correct	  macroeconomic	   imbalances	   that	   indicate	   ‘any	  
trend	   giving	   rise	   to	   macroeconomic	   developments	   which	   are	   adversely	   affecting,	   or	   have	   the	   potential	  
adversely	   to	   affect,	   the	   proper	   functioning	   of	   the	   economy	   of	   a	  Member	   State	   or	   of	   the	   economic	   and	  
monetary	  union,	  or	  of	  the	  Union	  as	  a	  whole’.	  Imbalances	  are	  considered	  ‘excessive’	  when	  they	  jeopardise	  
or	   risk	   jeopardising	   the	  proper	   functioning	  of	   the	  economic	   and	  monetary	  union	   (Regulation	  1176/2001,	  
Article	  2).	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  apparently	  clear	  definition,	  identifying	  when	  an	  imbalance	  becomes	  excessive	  is	  a	  
controversial	  activity.	  	  
To	  start	  with,	   imbalances	   themselves	  do	  not	   represent	  an	   immediate	   threat:	  external	  deficits	  are	  
usually	  financed	  by	  borrowing	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  problem	  lies	  in	  anticipating	  the	  moment	  at	  
which	   private	   lenders	   will	   cut	   lending	   and	   ask	   for	   repayment.	   Furthermore,	   there	   are	   many	   sources	   of	  
macroeconomic	  imbalances,	  and	  conflicting	  recommended	  diagnoses.	  For	  instance,	  there	  are	  at	   least	  two	  
competing	   explanations	   for	   the	   external	   imbalances	  of	   euro	   area	   countries:	   imbalances	   are	   explained	   as	  
either	   the	   outcome	   of	   undisciplined	   fiscal	   policies	   or	   the	   consequence	   of	   divergences	   in	   saving	   patterns	  
(Wyplosz,	   2010).	   Under	   the	   first	   reading,	   expansionary	   fiscal	   policies	   in	   the	   deficit	   countries	   supported	  
domestic	  demand	   that	   then	   led	   to	  higher	   inflation.	  Relative	  prices	  between	  different	  Eurozone	  countries	  
became	   sizable,	   with	   consumer	   prices	   and	   unit	   labour	   costs	   rising	   very	   significantly	   in	   the	   Eurozone	  
periphery	   relative	   to	   the	   core,	   and	   particularly	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Germany	   (Chen	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   Under	   the	   second	  
explanation,	   however,	   declining	   savings	   rates	   led	   to	   excessive	   imbalances	   because	   they	   reflected	   rapid	  
credit	  growth	  and	  poor	  market	  discipline	  (De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji,	  2012;	  Gros,	  2012).	  Easy	  financing	  would	  have	  
allowed	  deficit	  countries	  to	  sustain	  the	  appreciation	  of	  real	  effective	  exchange	  rates	  and	  delayed	  the	  need	  
for	  adjustment	  (Chen	  et	  al.,	  2012,	  3)	  
Whatever	  their	  origins,	  the	  crisis	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  has	  emphasised	  the	  impact	  of	  imbalances	  on	  the	  
stability	  of	  the	  monetary	  union.	  As	  two	  top	  officials	  of	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  
Affairs	   explain,	   the	   European	  debt	   crisis	   cannot	   be	   solely	   traced	  back	   to	   fiscal	   profligacy	  but	   is	   part	   of	   a	  
much	   wider	   set	   of	   macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   developments	   that	   must	   now	   be	   monitored	   (Buti	   and	  
Carnot,	  2012,	  p.	  905).	  The	  MIP	  can	  thus	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  complement	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  Stability	  
and	  Growth	  Pact	  (SGP).	  	  
As	   for	   the	   modalities	   of	   the	   new	   EU	   surveillance,	   the	   procedure	   starts	   with	   regular	   checks	   on	  
Member	  States’	  economic	  policies.	  Specifically,	  each	  year,	  the	  Commission	  publishes	  an	  Alert	  Mechanism	  
Report	   (AMR)	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   providing	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   developments	   of	   key	  macroeconomic	  
indicators	  in	  the	  Member	  States,	  including	  indicators	  of	  external	  competitiveness	  and	  internal	  imbalances.	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   application	   of	   the	   indicator-­‐based	   scoreboard,	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   Commission	   is	  
based	  on	  a	  qualitative	  analysis.	  This	  approach	  gives	  the	  EU	  Commission	  both	  flexibility	  and	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  
discretion	  in	  interpreting	  the	  data.	  
	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  AMR	  do	  not	  automatically	  trigger	  action;	  rather,	  
they	   serve	   as	   a	   filter	   with	   which	   to	   identify	   countries	   and	   issues	   for	   which	   more	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   is	  
required.4	  It	   is	  only	  following	  feedback	  from	  Member	  States	  that	  meet	  in	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Euro	  Group	  
that	  the	  Commission	  decides	  on	  the	  countries	  for	  which	  it	  will	  prepare	  in-­‐depth	  reviews.	  These	  reviews	  aim	  
to	  assess	  the	  origin,	  nature	  and	  severity	  of	  possible	  macroeconomic	  imbalances.	  Their	  drafting	  may	  involve	  
missions	   to	   the	  Member	   State	   concerned.	   If	   the	  Member	   State	   is	   part	   of	   the	  Eurozone,	   the	  Commission	  
may	  invite	  representatives	  of	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  to	  participate	  in	  surveillance	  missions.	  	  
The	  in-­‐depth	  reviews	  can	  lead	  to	  three	  different	  outcomes.	  First,	  if	  the	  European	  Commission	  does	  
not	  detect	  any	  macroeconomic	  imbalances,	  it	  will	  not	  propose	  any	  further	  steps.	  Second,	  if	  macroeconomic	  
imbalances	   are	   detected,	   the	   Commission	   advises	   the	   Council	   to	   issue	   recommendations	   for	   preventive	  
action	   to	   the	   affected	   Member	   State	   based	   on	   Article	   121(2)	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   the	   Functioning	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  (TFEU).	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  European	  Council	  will	  issue	  recommendations	  for	  
the	   correction	   of	   the	   macroeconomic	   imbalances	   to	   the	   Member	   State	   as	   part	   of	   the	   country-­‐specific	  
recommendations	   issued	   in	   June.	   Third,	   if	   the	   European	   Commission	   detects	   excessive	   imbalances	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 At the time of writing, in-depth reviews have been published in May 2012 and April 2013 for 12 and 13 countries, 
respectively. 
could	   jeopardise	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   monetary	   union,	   it	   will	   advise	   the	   Council	   to	   issue	  
recommendations	   for	   corrective	   action	   to	   the	   affected	  Member	   State	   based	   on	   Article	   121(4)	   TFEU.	   In	  
contrast	  to	  the	  second	  outcome,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  ensuing	  recommendations	  will	  also	  activate	  the	  corrective	  
arm	   of	   the	   MIP.	   In	   particular,	   the	   Commission	   will	   advise	   the	   Council	   to	   open	   an	   excessive	   imbalance	  
procedure	   (EIP).	   One	   of	   the	   major	   innovations	   of	   the	   procedure	   is	   the	   use	   of	   RQMV.	   Under	   RQMV,	   a	  
Council	  decision	  on	  a	  Commission	  recommendation	  regarding	  the	  activation	  of	  sanctions	  against	  Eurozone	  
Member	  States	   is	  deemed	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  unless	   it	  decides,	  by	  qualified	  majority,	   to	  reject	  
the	  recommendation	  within	  ten	  days.	  
The	   launch	   of	   the	   EIP	   implies	   that	   the	   Member	   State	   concerned	   will	   be	   placed	   under	   stricter	  
economic	   policy	   surveillance.	   The	   Member	   State	   concerned	   will	   also	   be	   obliged	   to	   submit	   a	   corrective	  
action	  plan	  (CAP).	  The	  CAP	  sets	  up	  a	  roadmap	  to	  implement	  corrective	  policy	  actions,	  detail	  the	  corrective	  
actions	  that	  will	  be	  adopted	  and	  specify	  the	  implementation	  timetable.	  Under	  the	  EIP,	  implementation	  shall	  
be	  assured	  by	   the	  Member	  State	   regularly	   reporting	   to	   the	  Council	   and	   the	  Commission	  on	   the	  progress	  
made	  towards	  the	   implementation	  of	  the	  Council	  recommendations.	  The	  Commission	  will	  also	  assess	  the	  
state’s	  progress	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  reports	  and	  possible	  country	  surveillance	  missions.	  	  
Under	   the	   EIP,	   financial	   sanctions	   are	   foreseen	   only	   for	   Eurozone	  Members.	   In	   particular,	   if	   the	  
Member	   States	   concerned	   fail	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   recommended	   corrective	   action,	   an	   interest-­‐bearing	  
deposit	   equal	   to	   0.1%	   of	   the	   country’s	   GDP	   will	   be	   imposed.	   This	   penalty	   is	   to	   be	   deposited	   with	   the	  
European	  Commission.	  A	  sanction	  can	  also	  be	  imposed	  for	  repeatedly	  failing	  to	  deliver	  “appropriate	  action”	  
under	  the	  EIP.	  Specifically,	  two	  consecutive	  negative	  evaluations	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  corrective	  action	  plan	  
or	  the	  implementation	  of	  corrective	  measures	  will	  entail	  an	  annual	  fine	  equal	  to	  0.1%	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP.	  
The	  EIP	  will	  be	  terminated	  once	  the	  Council,	  based	  on	  a	  recommendation	  from	  the	  European	  Commission,	  
determines	  that	  the	  imbalances	  have	  been	  effectively	  eliminated.	  
	  
2. What makes international economic surveillance effective? The IMF experience 
	  
Although	  the	  prevention	  (and	  correction)	  of	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  task	  for	  the	  EU	  
to	   perform,	   this	   activity	   stands	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   IMF's	   functioning	   since	   its	   creation	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
Second	  World	  War.	  Indeed,	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  mandate	  the	  IMF	  to	  exercise	  ‘firm	  surveillance’	  over	  
the	   economic	   policies	   of	   its	   member	   countries.5	   To	   fulfil	   its	   mandate,	   the	   Fund	   regularly	   monitors	   the	  
domestic	  policies	  of	  its	  members	  to	  identify	  the	  potential	  sources	  of	  aggregate	  imbalances	  that	  could	  cause	  
the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  country’s	  balance	  of	  payments.	  	  
The	   Fund’s	   record	   in	   fulfilling	   this	  mandate,	   however,	   is	   rather	  mixed.	   Although	   its	   analyses	   and	  
advice	  are	  certainly	  an	  example	  of	  high-­‐quality	   research	  and	  good	   intentions,	   the	  Fund	  has	  often	  missed	  
the	  signs	  of	  impending	  crises.	  When	  the	  signs	  have	  been	  correctly	  detected,	  the	  Fund	  has	  failed	  to	  induce	  
remedial	   political	   action	   from	   domestic	   authorities.	   The	   events	   associated	  with	   the	   latest	   financial	   crisis	  
provide	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  these	  arguments.	  In	  this	  case,	  as	  the	  Independent	  Evaluation	  Office	  (IEO)	  (IEO,	  
2011,	   p.	   4)	   has	   authoritatively	   demonstrated,	   ‘the	   IMF	   did	   not	   anticipate	   the	   crisis,	   its	   timing,	   or	   its	  
magnitude’.	  
	   The	  failures	  of	  IMF	  surveillance	  have	  attracted	  attention	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  Fund.	  Without	  
claiming	   to	   be	   exhaustive,	   the	  main	   problems	   that	   have	   been	   identified	   can	   be	   separated	   according	   to	  
whether	   they	   pertain	   to	   the	   content	   of	   the	   surveillance	   reports	   or	   to	   the	   procedures	   through	   which	  
surveillance	   is	   conducted.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Fund’s	   surveillance	   has	   been	   found	   wanting	   in	   both	   its	  
preventative	  and	  corrective	  arms	  (Table	  1).	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The term ‘firm surveillance’ was introduced in 1979 with the adoption of the second amendment to the Fund’s 
Articles.  
Table	  1.	  Causes	  of	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  IMF	  surveillance	  
	  
	  
Starting	   from	   the	   upper-­‐left	   quadrant	   of	   Table	   1,	   three	   main	   problems	   have	   been	   identified	   to	  
account	  for	  the	  Fund’s	  limited	  effectiveness	  in	  detecting	  macroeconomic	  imbalances.	  First,	  IMF	  surveillance	  
reports	   seem	   to	   have	   suffered	   from	   poor	   timeliness	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   specific	   advice.	   Regarding	   timeliness	  
specifically,	  the	  time	  lag	  between	  the	  surveillance	  mission,	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  staff	  report	  and	  the	  ensuing	  
Executive	   Board	   discussion	   has	   usually	   been	   too	   long,	   with	   the	   result	   that	   recommendations	   are	   made	  
public	  when	   they	  are	  no	   longer	   relevant	   to	   countries’	   economic	  problems	   (IMF,	  2008).	   Furthermore,	   the	  
Fund’s	  surveillance	  advice	  has	  often	  been	  found	  wanting	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  limited	  specificity	  and	  practicality.	  
For	   instance,	   interviews	   of	   country	   authorities	   have	   revealed	   that	   member	   countries	   perceive	   a	   lack	   of	  
relevance	  and	  genuine	  value	  in	  some	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  recommendations	  (IEO,	  2013,	  p.	  8).	  	  
Second,	  the	  IMF	  has	  been	  blamed	  for	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  its	  message.	  IMF	  analyses	  of	  domestic	  
economies	   and	   global	   developments	   have	   been	   scattered	   and	   dispersed	   across	   the	   several	   surveillance	  
reports	   that	   the	   IMF	   regularly	   produces	   (IMF,	   2011a;	   Pickford,	   2011).	   The	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   Fund’s	  
analysis	  also	  contributes	  to	  an	  inability	  to	  grasp	  both	  policy	  spill-­‐overs	  across	  countries	  and	  economic	  and	  
financial	   interconnections	   (IMF,	   2011a;	   IEO,	   2006).	   In	   short,	   the	   Fund	   has	   performed	   poorly	   in	   systemic	  
surveillance.	  
Finally,	  IMF	  surveillance	  has	  long	  paid	  insufficient	  attention	  to	  financial	  sector	  issues	  and	  has	  thus	  failed	  
to	  recognise	  the	  financial	  sources	  of	  macroeconomic	  instability	  (i.e.,	  the	  so-­‐called	  macro-­‐financial	  linkages)	  
(IMF,	  1995,	  1999).	  Although	  there	  have	  been	  important	  improvements	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  financial	  analyses	  over	  
time	  (Moschella,	  2011),	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  2007	  crisis,	  staff	  continued	  to	  focus	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  global	  
imbalances	  and	  disorderly	  dollar	  decline	  as	  the	  key	  risks	  to	  global	  stability,	  largely	  failing	  to	  take	  action	  to	  
address	  the	  risks	  building	  up	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  (IEO,	  2011).	  	  
IMF	  surveillance	  has	  also	  been	  found	  to	  be	  of	  limited	  effectiveness	  in	  inducing	  corrective	  action,	  as	  
evidenced	   in	   the	   upper-­‐right	   box	   in	   Table	   1.	   Specifically,	   many	   features	   of	   the	   Fund’s	   reports	   have	  
repeatedly	  weakened	  the	  influence	  of	  surveillance	  recommendations.	  To	  start	  with,	  IMF	  reports	  are	  often	  
perceived	   as	   providing	   uneven,	   asymmetric	   treatment	   to	   different	   groups	   of	   countries.	   The	   general	  
perception	  is	  that	  whereas	  advanced	  economies	  usually	  receive	  quite	  gentle	  advice,	  emerging	  market	  and	  
developing	  countries	  receive	  much	  tougher	  analyses	  and	  stringent	  recommendations	  (IEO,	  2013).6	  In	  short,	  
countries	  are	  not	  always	  treated	  equally	  (Lombardi	  and	  Woods,	  2008,	  p.	  732),	  with	  negative	  consequences	  
for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  policy	  advice.	  As	  surveys	  of	  country	  authorities	  reveal,	  the	  perception	  of	  
even-­‐handed	  treatment	   is	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	   for	   seeking	   the	  Fund’s	  advice	  and	  considering	   following	   it	   (IEO,	  
2013).	  	  
Another	   factor	   that	   weakens	   the	   corrective	   potential	   of	   IMF	   surveillance	   is	   the	   insufficient	  
knowledge	   of	   domestic	   polity,	   politics	   and	   policy.	   IMF	   staff	  members	   are	   often	   unaware	   of	   the	   political	  
challenges	  that	  domestic	  authorities	  are	   likely	  to	  confront	   in	   implementing	  the	  Fund’s	  recommendations.	  
For	   instance,	   interviews	  with	   country	   authorities	   reveal	   that	   a	   substantial	   number	  of	   country	   authorities	  
believed	  that	  the	  IMF	  lacked	  sufficient	  knowledge	  of	  country	  specifics	  for	  its	  advice	  to	  be	  useful,	  especially	  
in	  large	  emerging-­‐market	  countries	  (IEO,	  2013,	  p.	  22).	  	  
Moving	  to	  the	   lower-­‐level	  quadrants	   in	  Table	  1,	  several	  procedural	  aspects	  are	  also	  recognised	  to	  
have	  reduced	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  IMF	  advice.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  preventative	  stage	  of	  surveillance,	  it	  has	  
been	  noted	  that	  the	  Fund’s	  analyses	  have	  often	  failed	  due	  to	  the	  organisation’s	  reluctance	  to	  ‘speak	  truth	  
to	  power’.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  candidness	  of	  surveillance	  reports	  has	  often	  been	  compromised	  by	  political	  
(as	   opposed	   to	   technical)	   considerations	   (Cottarelli,	   2005;	   Fratzscher	   and	   Reynaud,	   2007;	   Odling-­‐Smee,	  
2004).	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  now	  widely	  documented	  that	  IMF	  staff	  members	  were	  ‘overly	  influenced	  by	  (and	  
sometimes	  in	  the	  awe	  of)	  the	  [advanced	  countries]	  authorities’	  reputation	  and	  expertise’	  and	  therefore	  felt	  
uncomfortable	   challenging	   their	   views	   on	   financial	   regulatory	   and	   supervisory	   issues	   (IEO,	   2011).	   A	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It is interesting to note that recent assistance programs for EU countries are seen by several national authorities outside 
Europe as a further instance of the uneven treatment that the Fund reserves for its members (IEO, 2013, p. 29). 
corollary	  of	  the	  distortive	  influence	  that	  power	  considerations	  play	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  surveillance	  
is	  that	  the	  Fund	  has	  no	  material	  influence	  over	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  major	  developed	  countries	  that	  are	  
not	  subject	  to	  Fund	  conditionality	  (IMF,	  2011a,	  p.	  20).	  
The	   Fund’s	   ability	   to	   induce	   remedial	   political	   action	   is	   also	   weakened	   by	   a	   sort	   of	   ‘top-­‐down’	  
approach	   to	   surveillance	   that	   limits	   the	   involvement	   of	   country	   authorities	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	  
domestic	   economy.	   This	   approach	   has	   been	   particularly	   detrimental	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Fund’s	  
recommendations	  because	  it	  has	  instilled	  in	  domestic	  authorities	  the	  feeling	  that	  they	  lack	  ownership	  over	  
the	   content	   of	   reports.	   In	   other	   words,	   surveillance	   consultations	   have	   been	   perceived	   as	   a	   ‘one-­‐way	  
process’	   in	   which	   IMF	   staff	   teams	   set	   the	   agenda	   and	   only	   require	   national	   authorities	   to	   ‘tick	   boxes’	  
(Momani,	   2006)	   without	   being	   accountable	   for	   the	   political	   consequences	   associated	   with	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  Fund's	  recommendations	  (Stiglitz,	  2003,	  118-­‐120).	  	  
The	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  corrective	  arm	  of	   IMF	  surveillance	   is	  also	  negatively	  affected	  by	   the	   fact	  
that	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  enforce	  members’	  compliance	  with	  its	  recommendations.	  As	  the	  Fund	  itself	  clarifies,	  ‘the	  
Fund’s	   approach	   to	   surveillance	   has	  mainly	   relied	   on	   dialogue	   and	   persuasion,	   within	   a	   framework	   that	  
includes	   specific	   obligations	   and	   guidance	   on	   the	   conduct	   of	   policies’	   (IMF,	   2011b,	   12).	   IMF	   surveillance	  
thus	  represents	  a	  soft	  form	  of	  coordination	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  either	  legal	  obligation	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  
specific	  sanctions	  (Hodson,	  2004);	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Fund	  has	  no	  weapons	  with	  which	  
to	   force	  members	   to	   comply	   with	   its	   recommendations.	   A	  member	   in	   breach	   of	   its	   obligations	  may	   be	  
denied	  the	  benefits	  of	  membership	  and	  thus	  be	  ineligible	  to	  use	  the	  Fund’s	  resources	  or	  exercise	  its	  voting	  
rights	   and	   can	   even	   be	   expelled.	   Interestingly,	   however,	   no	   such	   sanction	   has	   ever	   been	   applied	   to	  
members	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  surveillance	  obligations,	  and	  even	  when	  the	  Fund	  has	  considered	  the	  option	  
of	  flagging	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  its	  advice,	   its	  activities	  have	  been	  met	  with	  stiff	  resistance	  from	  member	  
countries.	  The	   reluctance	   to	  use	   the	   label	   ‘currency	  manipulator’	  against	  China	  after	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  
2007	  Decision	  is	  an	  apt	  case	  in	  point	  (Blustein,	  2012).	  	  
In	   short,	   the	   history	   of	   Fund	   surveillance	   reveals	   important	   policy	   lessons	   about	   the	   factors	   that	  
may	  result	   in	   ineffective	   international	  economic	  surveillance.	   In	   the	   following	  section,	   the	  paper	  assesses	  
how	  the	  MIP	  performs	  as	  compared	  to	  these	  findings.	  	  
	  
3. Assessing the MIP effectiveness: The strengths of the new procedure 
	  
Some	  notes	  of	  caution	  are	  first	  required.	  Specifically,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  assessment	  of	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  MIP	  is	  in	  no	  way	  definitive,	  as	  no	  solid	  history	  of	  EU	  macroeconomic	  surveillance	  is	  
available	   at	   this	   stage.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   only	   two	   AMRs	   have	   been	   released	   (in	   February	   and	  
November	  2012),	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  two	  sets	  of	   in-­‐depth	  reviews	  have	  been	  undertaken	  to	  determine	  
whether	   macroeconomic	   imbalances	   exist	   or	   are	   at	   risk	   of	   emerging	   (in	   May	   2012	   and	   April	   2013,	  
respectively).	  Furthermore,	  the	  new	  surveillance	  procedures	  have	  yet	  to	  become	  well-­‐established	  practices,	  
which	  could	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  gap	  between	  the	  proposed	  institutional	  design	  and	  its	  actual	  operation.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  these	  observations,	  the	  rules	  enshrined	  in	  the	  MIP	  and	  the	  first	  surveillance	  assessments	  
since	   2011	   provide	   empirical	   evidence	   for	   an	   initial	   systematic	   comparison	   between	   the	   new	   EU	  
surveillance	  and	  Fund	  surveillance.	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  comparison	  are	  summarised	  in	  Table	  2.	  The	  aspects	  
in	  which	  the	  MIP	  appears	  to	  be	  potentially	  more	  effective	  than	  IMF	  surveillance	  are	  in	  italics.	  
	  
Table	  2.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  MIP	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  Fund’s	  macroeconomic	  surveillance	  
	  
	  
Beginning	  with	   the	   strengths	  of	   the	  MIP,	  one	  of	   the	   first	   aspects	  worth	  noting	   is	   that	   the	  MIP	   is	  
clearly	   inscribed	   into	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  European	  Semester.	  As	   a	   result,	  macroeconomic	   surveillance	  
takes	   place	   in	   a	   timely	   and	   predictable	   fashion,	   with	   well-­‐established	   monitoring	   steps	   distributed	  
throughout	   each	   year.	   Strict	   deadlines	   throughout	   the	   surveillance	   process	   also	   aim	   at	   avoiding	   lengthy	  
procedures.	   Furthermore,	   no	   significant	   time	   lags	   are	   expected	   to	   develop	   between	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	  
reports	  and	  their	  technical	  and	  political	  discussion.	  
The	   reliance	   on	   a	   scoreboard	   to	   assess	   domestic	   economic	   policies	   is	   a	   further	   element	   that	  
distinguishes	  the	  MIP	  from	  the	  IMF	  surveillance.	   In	  particular,	  the	  EU	  Commission	  is	  bound	  to	  develop	  its	  
surveillance	   analyses	   based	   on	   a	   set	   of	   agreed	   quantitative	   indicators	   (complemented	   by	   qualitative	  
analysis),	   which	   orient	   the	   Commission	   towards	   specific,	   pragmatic	   advice.	   The	   Commission's	  
recommendations	   are	   thus	   expected	   to	   help	   member	   countries	   meet	   specific	   targets	   within	   previously	  
agreed-­‐upon	  thresholds.	  The	  same	  level	  of	  specificity	   is	  also	  found	  in	  the	  content	  of	  the	  corrective	  action	  
programs.	  	  
The	  MIP	  also	  performs	  better	  than	  the	  IMF	  surveillance	  in	  at	  least	  one	  another	  important	  respect:	  
the	  involvement	  of	  national	  authorities	  and	  the	  knowledge	  of	  domestic	  politics.	   Indeed,	  although	  the	  EU-­‐
domestic	   relationship	   may	   be	   undermined	   by	   the	   asymmetry	   that	   informs	   the	   procedure,	   as	   discussed	  
below,	   the	   continuous	   interaction	   between	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	   EU	   levels	   is	   a	   bulwark	   against	   the	  
perception	   of	   a	   ‘one-­‐way-­‐process’	   that	   characterises	   the	   workings	   of	   the	   Fund.	   The	   design	   of	   the	   EU	  
macroeconomic	   surveillance	   also	   increases	   its	   potential	   effectiveness	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   Fund’s	  
surveillance	  because	  it	   includes	  a	  number	  of	  features	  that	  strengthen	  the	  corrective	  arm.	  As	  distinct	  from	  
the	   Fund	   surveillance,	   the	   consequences	   of	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   the	   Commission	   and	   Council	  
recommendations	   are	   clearly	   specified	   in	   advance.	   Furthermore,	   where	   the	   Fund	   is	   reluctant	   to	   use	  
sanctions	   to	   induce	  compliance,	  based	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	   traction	   ‘has	   to	  be	  earned’	   rather	   than	  
imposed	   (IMF,	   2011a,	   p.	   20),	   the	   MIP	   makes	   sanctions	   a	   key	   instrument	   with	   which	   to	   achieve	   the	  
correction	  of	  macroeconomic	  imbalances.	  As	  illustrated	  above,	  the	  corrective	  aspect	  of	  the	  MIP	  includes	  a	  
list	   of	   sanctions	   that	   will	   be	   imposed	   if	   a	   country	   does	   not	   act	   on	   the	   proposed	   recommendations.	   In	  
particular,	   under	   the	   EIP,	   financial	   sanctions	   (up	   to	   0.1%	   of	   GDP)	   are	   proposed	   if	   the	   Member	   States	  
concerned	   fail	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   recommended	   corrective	   action.	   A	   sanction	   can	   also	   be	   imposed	   for	  
twice	  failing	  to	  submit	  a	  sufficient	  corrective	  action	  plan.	  	  
The	  MIP	   also	   introduces	  mechanisms	   to	   facilitate	   the	   activation	   of	   the	   prescribed	   sanctions.	   The	  
introduction	  of	  RQMV	  is	  the	  key	   institutional	   innovation	  here	  because	   it	  enhances	  the	   likelihood	  that	  the	  
surveillance	   process	   will	   proceed	   as	   planned	   rather	   than	   being	   blocked	   by	   political	   considerations.	  
Specifically,	  the	  prescription	  that	  the	  Commission	  recommendations	  will	  be	  accepted	  unless	  rejected	  by	  a	  
qualified	  majority	  in	  the	  Council	  increases	  the	  almost-­‐automaticity	  of	  the	  process.	  The	  final	  warning,	  which	  
is	   required	   for	   sanctions	   to	   be	   activated,	   will	   be	   adopted	   more	   easily	   if	   no	   majority	   is	   required	   for	   its	  
adoption.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  qualified	  majority	  is	  not	  required	  to	  activate	  sanctions,	  only	  to	  block	  them.	  	  
This	  procedure	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  most	  international	  economic	  surveillance,	  including	  that	  
of	   the	   IMF.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   largely	   acknowledged	   that	   one	   of	   the	   key	   problems	   in	   international	   economic	  
surveillance	   lies	   in	   the	   political,	   consensual	   procedure	   that	   hinders	   the	   activation	   of	   the	   corrective	  
mechanisms.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  commitments	  can	  be	  effectively	  enforced	  if	  a	  consensual	  
decision	  has	   to	  be	   reached	  among	  all	  members,	   including	   the	  one	   that	   is	   deemed	   to	  have	  breached	   the	  
rules.7	  This	   is	  exactly	  the	  criticism	  that	  has	  been	  raised	  of	   the	  SGP.	   Indeed,	  one	  of	   the	  key	  problems	  that	  
made	   the	   excessive	   deficit	   procedure	   ineffective	   was	   that	   governments	   that	   breached	   the	   rules	   acted	  
simultaneously	  as	  the	  accused,	  judge	  and	  jury	  (Buiter,	  2006,	  p.	  689).	  
Another	  major	  strength	  of	  the	  MIP	  as	  compared	  to	  IMF	  surveillance	  lies	  in	  its	  integration	  with	  the	  
broad	   EU	   economic	   surveillance	   framework. For	   instance,	   if,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   its	   in-­‐depth	   reviews,	   the	  
Commission	  considers	  that	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  exist,	  it	  may	  issue	  policy	  recommendations	  for	  the	  
Member	   States	   concerned.	   These	   recommendations	   will	   be	   part	   of	   the	   integrated	   package	   of	  
recommendations	  under	  the	  European	  Semester	  aimed	  at	  assessing	  fiscal	  and	  structural	  policies	  in	  addition	  
to	   macroeconomic	   imbalances.	   The	   MIP	   is	   also	   integrated	   with	   the	   enhanced	   surveillance	   framework	  
introduced	  with	  the	  ‘two-­‐pack’	   legislation,	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  May	  2013	  in	  all	  Eurozone	  Member	  
States.	  In	  particular,	  to	  avoid	  the	  duplication	  of	  monitoring	  and	  reporting	  obligations,	  the	  implementation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For example, in the Financial Stability Board, a country is unlikely to have its membership revoked for non-
compliance unless it supports the decision in the Plenary against itself (Helleiner, 2010; Moschella, 2012). 
of	   the	   MIP	   and	   its	   corrective	   arm	   will	   be	   suspended	   when	   the	   member	   country	   concerned	   is	   under	   a	  
macroeconomic	  adjustment	  programme.	  
A	   first-­‐cut	   assessment	   of	   the	   MIP	   against	   the	   benchmark	   provided	   by	   the	   IMF	   leads	   to	   the	  
conclusion	   that	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   new	   EU	   surveillance	   is	   potentially	   greater	   than	   the	   Fund’s	  
surveillance.	  Specifically,	  the	  MIP	  is	  based	  on	  a	  more	  systemic	  and	  timely	  dialogue	  between	  EU	  institutions	  
and	  domestic	  authorities,	  and	  its	  analyses	  are	  based	  on	  clearly	  specified	  indicators	  that	  may	  help	  increase	  
the	   precision	   and	   practicality	   of	   the	   EU	   recommendations.	   These	   recommendations,	   in	   turn,	   are	   largely	  
integrated	   into	   the	   EU	   broad	   economic	   surveillance	   framework.	   The	  MIP	   is	   also	   better	   placed	   than	   IMF	  
surveillance	  in	  its	  corrective	  arm	  because	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  use	  of	  sanctions,	  whose	  activation	  has	  been	  made	  
easier	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  RQMV.	  	  
	  
4. Assessing the MIP’s effectiveness: The weaknesses of the new procedure 
	  
	  
Although	   the	   MIP	   presents	   some	   more	   effective	   mechanisms	   than	   IMF	   surveillance,	   a	   closer	  
examination	   of	   the	   new	   EU	   surveillance	   leads	   to	   a	   more	   nuanced	   assessment	   of	   its	   effectiveness.	  
Specifically,	  some	  problematic	  aspects	  characterise	  its	  institutional	  design	  and	  operating	  procedures.	  These	  
aspects	   are	   particularly	   evident	   when	   the	   economic	   and	   political	   realities	   in	   which	   the	   EU	   operates	   are	  
taken	  into	  consideration.	  	  
To	  start	  with,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  important	  efforts	  at	  facilitating	  the	  activation	  of	  sanctions	  through	  
the	  use	  of	  RQMV,	  the	  new	  voting	  majority	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  corrective	  stage	  of	  the	  surveillance	  process.	  In	  
contrast,	  the	  RQMV	  does	  not	  apply	  for	  the	  Council	  discussion	  of	  the	  AMR,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  list	  of	  
Member	  States	  for	  which	  in-­‐depth	  reviews	  are	  warranted	  is	  identified.	  Furthermore,	  the	  question	  can	  still	  
be	  raised	  as	  to	  whether	  sanctions	  will	  be	  activated	  at	  all,	  especially	  towards	  the	  core	  Eurozone	  countries.	  
The	  experience	  with	  the	  SGP	  does	  not	  bode	  well	  in	  this	  respect.	  Although	  the	  SGP	  already	  provided	  for	  the	  
use	  of	  sanctions,	  the	  Council	  decision	  in	  November	  2003	  to	  suspend	  the	  excessive	  deficit	  procedure	  (EDP),	  
under	  pressure	   from	  Germany	  and	   France,	   left	   the	   impression	   that	  political	   considerations	   constrain	   the	  
activation	  of	  sanctions	  even	  when	  the	  latter	  are	  clearly	  specified.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  experience	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  
the	  letter	  of	  the	  MIP,	  there	  is	  no	  certainty	  that	  the	  new	  surveillance	  design	  will	  be	  more	  able	  than	  the	  IMF	  
to	  overcome	   the	   limitations	  of	   the	  enforcement	  mechanisms	   in	   its	  operational	  practice.	  This	   challenge	   is	  
especially	  formidable	  when	  large	  states	  exercise	  their	  discretionary	  power	  (c.f.	  Schure	  and	  Verdun,	  2008),	  
similarly	  to	  what	  occurs	  with	  the	  IMF,	  whose	  surveillance	  meets	  the	  greatest	  difficulties	  when	  directed	  at	  
the	  major	  industrial	  countries	  (Boughton,	  2001,	  135).	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  the	  existing	  sanctions	  
would	  actually	  become	  credible	  even	  if	  they	  were	  made	  tougher	  and	  their	  use	  simpler	  to	  activate	  (Wyplosz,	  
2010).	  	  
There	   are	   already	   rumours	   that	   this	   scenario	   materialised	   in	   the	   first	   alert	   mechanism	   reports	  
prepared	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	   February	   2012.	   For	   instance,	   it	   was	   leaked	   to	   the	   press	   that	   ‘Italy	   was	  
spared	  harsh	  criticisms	  also	  thanks	  to	  last-­‐minute	  pressures’	  (Bruxelles:	  debito	  ancora	  alto,	  bene	  i	  risparmi	  
privati,	   Il	   Sole	   24	   ore,	   14	   February	   2012,	   p.	   5).	   Likewise,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   2013	   EU	  Commission	   country-­‐
specific	  recommendations	  (CSRs)	  granted	  more	  time	  to	  some	  countries,	  notably	  Spain	  and	  France,	  to	  bring	  
their	  public	  deficits	  below	  the	  EU’s	  limit	  of	  3%	  of	  GDP	  is	  a	  forceful	  example	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  arbitrariness	  that	  
may	   characterise	   EU	   surveillance.8	   These	   examples	   are	   thus	   a	   strong	   reminder	   of	   the	   enforcement	  
problems	   that	   the	  MIP	   is	   likely	   to	   face,	   especially	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   mechanisms	   that	   ensure	   an	   even-­‐
handed	  treatment	  of	  the	  countries	  under	  the	  new	  surveillance.	  	  
This	  observation	  also	  speaks	  to	  another	  potential	  weakness	  of	  the	  MIP.	  Specifically,	  the	  MIP	  builds	  
on	  the	  application	  of	  asymmetric	   rules	   for	  bringing	  about	  macroeconomic	  adjustment.	  The	  asymmetry	   in	  
question	  applies	  to	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  countries	  (De	  Grauwe,	  2012).	  Indeed,	  although	  the	  new	  procedure	  
builds	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  Member	  States	  that	  accumulate	  large	  current-­‐account	  surpluses	  are	  as	  much	  
a	  source	  of	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  as	  deficit	  states	  are,	  the	  new	  regulations	  also	  stress	  that	  ‘the	  need	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In addition to Spain and France, the Commission’s recommendations, which were issued in May 2013, suggested an 
extension of the deadlines for correcting the excessive deficits in the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. 
for	   policy	   action	   is	   particularly	   pressing	   in	   Member	   States	   showing	   persistently	   large	   current-­‐account	  
deficits	   and	   competitiveness	   losses’	   (Regulation	   1176/2011,	   preliminary	   clause	   17).	   This	   asymmetric	  
understanding	  of	   the	   risks	  embodied	  by	   surplus	  and	  deficit	   countries	  had	  been	  clearly	  articulated	  during	  
the	  negotiations	  that	  led	  to	  the	  MIP.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Task	  Force	  set	  up	  by	  President	  Van	  Rompuy	  to	  chart	  
a	  path	  of	  reforms	  for	  the	  EU	  economic	  governance	  concluded	  that	  policy	  action	  ‘to	  address	  macroeconomic	  
imbalances	   and	   divergences	   in	   competitiveness	   is	   required	   in	   all	   Member	   States,	   but	   …	   [g]iven	  
vulnerabilities	   and	   the	   magnitude	   of	   the	   adjustment	   required,	   the	   need	   for	   policy	   action	   is	   particularly	  
pressing	   in	  Member	   States	   showing	  persistently	   large	   current-­‐account	  deficits	   and	   large	   competitiveness	  
losses.’9	  
The	   asymmetry	   inscribed	   into	   the	  MIP	   is	   further	   evident	   in	   the	   scoreboard	   thresholds	   that	   have	  
been	  chosen	  to	  provide	  a	  signalling	  device	  for	  potentially	  harmful	  current	  external	  imbalances.	  Indeed,	  the	  
indicative	   thresholds	   are	   by	   themselves	   asymmetric	   in	   that	   they	   refer	   to +6%	   of	   GDP	   for	   detecting	  
surpluses	  and	  -­‐4%	  of	  GDP	  for	  detecting	  deficits.10	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  MIP	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
reforms	  of	  economic	  governance	  in	  Europe	  have	  focused	  narrowly	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  persistent	  deficits	  
(Jones,	   2011).	   Serious	   doubts	   can	   be	   raised,	   however,	   about	   the	   success	   of	   this	   uncooperative	   strategy	  
(see,	   also,	   Temin	   and	   Vines,	   2013).	   Similarly	   to	   what	   happened	   during	   the	   Asian	   crisis,	   when	   the	   IMF	  
pushed	  all	  crisis-­‐hit	  countries	  to	  adopt	  more	  contractionary,	  rather	  than	  more	  expansionary,	  policies	  that	  
exacerbated	  the	  downward	  spiral	  in	  the	  region	  (c.f.	  Stiglitz,	  1997),	  asking	  EU	  debtor	  countries	  to	  cut	  labour	  
costs	   and	   reduce	   deficits	   while	   not	   asking	   surplus	   countries	   to	   share	   the	   burden	   of	   adjustment	   by	  
stimulating	  their	  aggregate	  demand	  has	  thus	  far	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  drag	  on	  economic	  recovery.	  In	  particular,	  
the	  spill-­‐over	  effects	  of	  coordinated	  fiscal	  consolidation	  across	  almost	  all	  EU	  countries	  have	  been	  translated	  
into	  a	   large	  negative	   impact	  on	  growth	   (Holland	  and	  Portes,	  2012).	  Furthermore,	   the	  strategy	  associated	  
with	   asymmetric	   adjustment	   risks	   creating	   public	   backlash	   and	   resentment	   towards	   the	   EU,	   similarly	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Report of the Task Force to the European Council, Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU, 21 October 2010. 
10 Specifically, the scoreboard indicator is the three-year backward moving average of the current account balance 
expressed in percent of GDP, based on Eurostat data. 
what	   has	   been	   noted	   for	   the	   top-­‐down	   IMF	   approach	   discussed	   above.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   an	   asymmetric	  
treatment	   diminishes	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   international	   surveillance	   procedures	   if	   citizens	   (and	   domestic	  
authorities)	   perceive	   that	   they	   are	   being	   treated	   differently	   and	   with	   harshness	   –	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	  
pronounced	  rise	  of	  Eurosceptic	  attitudes	  among	  the	  EU	  debtor	  countries	  (Serricchio,	  Tsakatika	  and	  Quaglia,	  
2013).	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   asymmetrical	   treatment,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   MIP	   could	   be	  
weakened	  by	  the	  predominant	  single-­‐country	  focus	  of	  the	  new	  procedure,	  which	  may	   lead	  to	  missing	  (or	  
downplaying)	  important	  systemic	  macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  developments.	  Indeed,	  although	  important	  
attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  integrate	  the	  MIP	  within	  the	  broad	  EU	  economic	  surveillance	  framework,	  the	  
core	  of	  the	  MIP	  surveillance	  revolves	  around	  the	  task	  of	  detecting	  problems	  in	  domestic	  policies	  that	  risk	  
undermining	  each	  member’s	  macroeconomic	  stability.	  Given	  this	  prevalent	  one-­‐country	  focus,	  and	  similarly	  
to	  what	  has	  been	  noted	  for	  the	  IMF,	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  MIP	  risk	  being	  weakened	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  
holistic	   picture	   that	   takes	   into	   consideration	   various	   sources	   of	   risks	   and	   their	   interconnections.	   This	  
narrow	  perspective	  could	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  task	  of	  preventing	  instability	  and	  thus	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	   the	  MIP	   procedure.11	   Indeed,	   if	   the	  monitoring	   activity	   is	   excessively	   focused	   on	   domestic	   economic	  
policies	   and	   their	   prospective	   development,	   the	   ability	   to	   identify	   the	   signs	   of	   impending	   crises	   at	   the	  
aggregate	  EU	  level	  may	  be	  negatively	  affected.	  	  
The	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  MIP	  could	  also	  be	  weakened	  by	  the	  separation	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  
analyses,	   again,	   one	   of	   the	   flaws	   that	   has	   long	   undermined	   IMF	   surveillance.	   For	   the	   MIP,	   the	   limited	  
incorporation	  of	   financial	   sector	   issues	   into	  macroeconomic	   analyses	   is	   a	   serious	  weakness,	   especially	   in	  
light	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  recent	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  Indeed,	  the	  rise	  in	  public	  debt	  levels	  in	  euro	  area	  
countries	  was	  most	  significant	  in	  relative	  terms	  in	  a	  few	  countries	  that	  started	  from	  low	  levels	  of	  debt,	  such	  
as	   Spain	   and	   Ireland.	   This	   condition	   points	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   macroeconomic	   stability	   can	   be	   negatively	  
affected	  by	  unsustainable	  developments	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Capital	  flows	  were	  also	  pivotal	  in	  the	  build-­‐
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up	  of	  imbalances	  before	  the	  crisis	  because	  they	  were	  either	  used	  to	  finance	  construction	  booms	  or	  because	  
they	  financed	  consumption	  (c.f.	  Gros,	  2012).	  
To	  do	   justice	   to	   the	  MIP,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	   although	   the	   first	   version	  of	   its	   scoreboard	  only	  
included	  major	  macroeconomic	   indicators,	   a	   new	   financial	   indicator	  was	   added	   in	   2012.	   The	   scoreboard	  
now	  includes	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  financial	  liabilities,	  which	  is	  meant	  to	  provide	  a	  measure	  of	  
the	  expansion	  of	  the	  exposure	  to	  potential	  risks	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  (European	  Commission,	  2012).	  This	  is	  
certainly	  a	  welcome	  development,	  but	   too	  strict	  a	  separation	  between	  economic	  and	   financial	  analysis	   is	  
still	  an	  unsolved	  problem,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  EU	  financial	  governance	  that	  followed	  the	  
publication	  of	  the	  de	  Larosière	  report	  (de	  Laroisière,	  2009;	  Quaglia,	  2013)	  and	  the	  delegation	  of	  supervisory	  
powers	  to	  the	  ECB.12	  For	  instance,	  although	  one	  of	  the	  tasks	  of	  the	  newly	  created	  European	  Systemic	  Risk	  
Board	  (ESRB)	  will	  be	  to	  identify	  excessive	  credit	  growth,	  which	  may	  well	  give	  rise	  to	  serious	  imbalances,	  the	  
arrangements	   that	   govern	   the	  new	  macroeconomic	   surveillance	   fall	   short	  of	  what	  would	  be	  desirable	   to	  
establish	  adequate	  coordination	  with	  the	  ESRB	  in	  this	  crucial	  area	  (Wyplosz,	  2010).	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	  MIP	  may	  well	  suffer	  from	  many	  of	  the	  same	  problems	  
that	  have	  diminished	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  IMF	  surveillance.	  In	  particular,	  the	  institutional	  design	  of	  the	  MIP	  
does	  not	  ensure	  that	  political	  considerations	  and	  asymmetric	  treatment	  of	  Member	  States	  will	  not	  interfere	  
with	   the	   activation	   of	   sanctions	   and	   the	   content	   of	   the	   recommendations	   issued	   to	  member	   countries.	  
Arbitrariness	   and	   asymmetric	   treatment	   could	   also	   be	   detrimental	   to	   the	   MIP’s	   effectiveness	   if	   they	  
generate	   public	   and	   political	   backlashes.	   Furthermore,	   the	   MIP’s	   effectiveness	   might	   be	   diluted	   by	   its	  
predominant	   single-­‐country	   focus	  and	   limited	   integration	  of	   economic	  and	   financial	   analyses,	  which	  may	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Interview with ECB officials, 3 June 2013. 
It	   is	   often	   the	   case	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	   EU	   that	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   crisis	   sparks	   a	   round	  of	   institutional	  
reforms	  aimed	  at	  deepening	  the	  level	  of	  integration	  and	  allowing	  the	  EU	  to	  respond	  to	  new	  challenges.	  The	  
sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  has	  been	  no	  exception,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  creation	  of	   the	  MIP,	  amongst	  other	  
reforms.	  By	  examining	  the	  institutional	  design	  and	  operating	  procedures	  of	  the	  MIP,	  this	  paper	  has	  begun	  
to	  assess	  its	  potential	  effectiveness	  through	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  Fund’s	  macroeconomic	  surveillance.	  
Although	  a	  definitive	  conclusion	  on	  the	  MIP	  would	  be	  premature	  at	  this	  stage,	  the	  comparison	  with	  
the	  Fund’s	  macroeconomic	  surveillance	  provides	  a	  nuanced	  assessment	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  MIP.	  On	  
the	   one	   hand,	   the	   comparison	   reveals	   that	   the	   MIP	   is	   much	   better	   placed	   than	   its	   IMF	   counterpart	   in	  
identifying	  imbalances	  and	  inducing	  corrective	  action	  because	  the	  new	  procedure	  performs	  better	  than	  the	  
Fund’s	  surveillance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  clear	  and	  practical	  advice,	  knowledge	  of	  domestic	  polities	  
and	  ease	  of	  activating	   sanctions.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  MIP	  has	  not	   remedied	   some	  of	   the	  well-­‐known	  
weaknesses	  that	  have	  long	  undermined	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  IMF	  surveillance,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  its	  historical	  
development	  and	  practical	  experience.	  Specifically,	   the	  MIP	  does	  not	  provide	   for	  mechanisms	   to	  prevent	  
political	  and	  arbitrary	  considerations	  from	  interfering	  with	  the	  decision	  to	  activate	  sanctions	  and	  on	  how	  to	  
share	   the	   burden	   of	   adjustment.	   Furthermore,	   the	   problems	   associated	   with	   uneven,	   asymmetric	  
surveillance	  have	  not	  been	  attenuated	  but	  are	   ingrained	   in	   the	  workings	  of	   the	  MIP,	   thus	   increasing	   the	  
probability	   of	   public	   backlashes.	   The	   single-­‐country	   focus	   of	   the	  MIP	   procedure	   and	   the	   thus	   far	   limited	  
integration	  of	  macroeconomic	  and	  financial	  analysis	   is	  another	  factor	  that	  may	  potentially	  undermine	  the	  
overall	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  new	  surveillance.	  	  
Given	   the	   EU’s	   inability	   to	   fully	   incorporate	   the	   lessons	   that	   were	   available	   from	   the	   Fund’s	  
experience,	   in	   these	   conclusions,	   it	   is	   worth	   reflecting	   on	   the	   factors	   that	   may	   help	   explain	   the	   null	  
hypothesis	  of	  this	  lack	  of	  learning	  (Radaelli,	  2009).	  This	  lack	  of	  learning	  is	  all	  the	  more	  puzzling	  because	  of	  
the	  presence	  of	  all	  the	  textbook	  conditions	  that	  the	  literature	  suggests	  for	  learning	  to	  take	  place,	  including	  
the	  pressure	  exerted	  by	  economic	  crises	  (Dolowitz	  and	  Marsh,	  2000,	  p.	  7),	  policy	  failures	  and	  dissatisfaction	  
with	  the	  status	  quo	  (Rose,	  1991,	  p.	  10)	  and	   interaction	  with	   international	  organisations	  (IOs)	  (Finnemore,	  
1996).	   These	   conditions	  were	   precisely	   those	   in	   place	   in	   the	   EU	   at	   the	   time	   the	  MIP	  was	   proposed	   and	  
adopted.	  Indeed,	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  Eurozone	  economic	  governance	  was	  certainly	  high	  following	  the	  
financial	   turmoil	   in	   the	   sovereign	   debt	   markets	   of	   some	   Member	   States	   in	   2009-­‐10.	   Furthermore,	  
interaction	  with	  the	  IMF	  has	  rarely	  been	  greater	  than	  following	  the	  Fund’s	  involvement	  with	  the	  EU	  rescue	  
programs	  and	  its	  role	  in	  monitoring	  the	  economic	  developments	  of	  the	  recipients	  of	  financial	  assistance.	  	  
To	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	   learning,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  briefly	  speculate	  on	  at	   least	  three	  factors	  that	  
contributed	   to	   this	   outcome	   (which	   also	   suggest	   areas	   for	   future	   research).	   First,	   foreign	   experience	  
competed	  with	   domestic	   experience.	   Specifically,	   the	   experience	  with	   the	   SGP	   provided	   a	  more	   familiar	  
base	   for	   learning	   than	   the	   Fund’s	   surveillance	   and	   thus	   oriented	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   MIP	   since	   its	  
negotiation.	  Indeed,	  participants	  in	  the	  negotiations	  recall	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  MIP	  was	  never	  discussed	  
on	  its	  own	  but	  as	  part	  of	  a	  ‘package’	  that	  included	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  SGP.	  In	  this	  process,	  the	  Commission	  
held	  the	  SGP	  as	  a	  model	  for	  the	  MIP	  so	  that	  the	  emerging	  new	  surveillance	  would	  be	  aligned	  with	  the	  other	  
EU	  surveillance	  procedures.13	  As	  the	  EU	  Commission	  puts	  it,	  ‘The	  overall	  design	  follows	  the	  implicit	  logic	  of	  
the	   stability	   and	   growth	   pact	  with	   a	   “preventive”	   arm	   and	   a	   stronger	   “corrective”	   arm	   for	  more	   serious	  
cases.’14	   This	   perspective	   suggests	   that,	   especially	   under	   crisis	   conditions,	   policy-­‐makers	   may	   face	  
competing	  incentives	  to	  select	  the	  sources	  of	  policy	  learning.	  	  
EU	  institutional	  fragmentation	  is	  another	  factor	  that	  hindered	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  from	  outside	  
experiences.	   Although	   the	   EU	   Commission	   played	   the	   agenda-­‐setting	   role	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
institutional	   design	   of	   the	  MIP,	   several	   other	   actors	  were	   involved	   in	   the	   process,	   including	   the	   Council	  
(through	  the	  ad	  hoc	  working	  group	  on	  economic	  governance),	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  ECB	  (with	  a	  
consultative	  role).15	  This	  crowded	   landscape	   is	   likely	  to	  have	  focused	  attention	  more	  on	  the	  need	  for	  EU-­‐
level	  coordination	  than	  on	  the	  transfer	  of	  knowledge	  from	  abroad.	   It	   is	  therefore	   logical	  to	  conclude	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interviews with officials at the ECB and EU Commission, Frankfurt and Brussels, April 2012 and May-June 2013. 
14 EU Commission, The MIP Framework, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/mip_framework/ind
ex_en.htm. 
15 Interview with participants in the MIP negotiations, Frankfurt and Brussels, April 2012, June 2013. 
the	  EU	  institutional	  system,	  in	  which	  several	  actors	  often	  meet	  in	  multiple	  arenas,	  creates	  difficulties	  with	  
downloading	  experience	  from	  abroad	  (Zito	  and	  Schout,	  2009,	  p.	  1114).	  	  
Finally,	  the	  involvement	  of	  member	  states	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  MIP	  and	  the	  political	  cleavage	  
between	  creditor	  and	  debtor	  countries	  is	  a	  further	  element	  that	  helps	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  learning	  from	  
the	   Fund’s	   experience.	   Indeed,	   during	   the	   negotiations	   on	   the	   new	   surveillance	   framework,	   the	   issue	   of	  
‘who	   adjusts’	   was	   one	   of	   the	   major	   bones	   of	   contention	   among	   member	   countries,	   with	   the	  
representatives	   of	   the	   southern	   European	   states	   advocating	   for	   a	   symmetrical	   treatment	   of	   current	  
account	   balances	   (Essl	   and	   Stiglbauer,	   2011,	   p.	   111).	   Similarly	   to	   what	   has	   been	   noted	   regarding	   the	  
institutional	  fragmentation	  discussed	  above,	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  MIP	  negotiations	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  
directed	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  need	  to	  forge	  an	  internal	  compromise	  rather	  than	  to	   learn	  from	  the	  most	  
relevant	  international	  experiences.	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   the	   comparison	   between	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	   new	   EU	   macroeconomic	   surveillance	  
provides	  useful	  insights	  into	  the	  relative	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  latter.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  comparison	  also	  
provides	  the	  building	  blocks	  from	  which	  to	  begin	  reflecting	  on	  the	  factors	  that	  may	  account	  for	  the	  process	  
of	   inter-­‐institutional	   learning	   (or	   lack	   thereof).	   Specifically,	   future	   research	   will	   be	   warranted	   to	   clarify	  
when	   the	   selection	   of	   one	   experiential	   basis	   (domestic	   or	   international)	   either	   ‘crowds	   out’	   or	  
complements	   another.	   Further	   research	  will	   also	   be	   needed	   to	   identify	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   EU-­‐









Table	  1.	  Causes	  of	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  IMF	  surveillance	  
	  






Poor	   timeliness	   and	   lack	   of	   specific	   and	  
practical	  advice	  	  
	  
Fragmented	   message	   and	   limited	  
systemic	  analysis	  
	  
Poor	   coverage	   of	   financial	   sector	   issues	  




Limited	   even-­‐handedness	   and	  
asymmetric	  treatment	  
	  













Limited	   involvement	   of	   national	  
authorities	  (one-­‐way	  street)	  
	  
Limited	   corrective	   measures	   and	  







Table	  2.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  MIP	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  Fund’s	  macroeconomic	  surveillance	  	  
	  






Increased	   timeliness	   and	   more	   practical	  
advice	  
	  
Fragmented	   message	   and	   limited	  
systemic	  analysis	  
	  
Poor	   coverage	   of	   financial	   sector	   issues	  
















Introduction	   of	   mechanisms	   to	   facilitate	  
the	  activation	  of	  sanctions	  
	  





Increased	   involvement	   with	   national	  
authorities	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